Japanese respondents' "impressions of one another's countries" were "unfavorable" (including "relatively unfavorable") with 93.0%. This has worsened since last year when the "unfavorable" impression of China exceeded 90% for the first time (90.1% last year) since the first opinion polls in 2005.

On the other hand, Chinese respondents who have an "Unfavorable" impression of Japan were 86.8%. It is still at a high level, yet it has improved since last year when the unfavorable impression hit the highest level on record at 92.8%. Further, "favorable" (including "relatively favorable") impression more than doubled since last year from 5.2% to 11.3% this year.

Nevertheless, on "The change in impressions of one another's countries over the past year," 66.7% (34.3%) of Japanese respondents and 57.3% (14.0% last year) of Chinese respondents answered that the impression toward each other's country has "worsened," and there are significant increases in both countries' polls.

The most common reason for the "unfavorable impression" of China among the Japanese public was "China's actions are incompatible with international rules" at 55.1% (47.9%), which is closely followed by "Chinese actions to secure resource, energy and food look selfish" at 52.8% (48.1% last year). Last year's most common answer "Continuous confrontation over the Senkaku Islands" has decreased from 53.2% last year to 50.4% and it became the fourth common answer. Thus there was a decrease in people who raise concerns over the confrontation on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and there was an increase in people who are concerned with China's hegemonic action as the reason for an "unfavorable" impression.

On the other hand, in the reasons why the Chinese respondents have an "unfavorable" impression of Japan, "The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands" and "Historical understanding" were the two prominent answers, which is the same as last year's result. Yet, it is worth noting that there were decreases in the number of people who raised these two reasons. In contrast, there is an increase in people who chose "Some Japanese politicians' careless remarks" at 31.3% (25.2% last year), and this indicates more people have an unfavorable impression due to Japanese politicians' inappropriate words and actions.

In the reasons for a "favorable" impression, "because of direct interaction with Chinese people, particularly with Chinese students in Japan, they are becoming familiar" was the most common answer by the Japanese respondents at 39.7% (32.3% last year). This shows that private interaction contributed to the "favorable" impression of China.

Among the reasons why the Chinese respondents had a "favorable impression," "Japanese products are high quality" (57.2%, 49.4% last year), "Japanese people are earnest and hardworking" (53.8%, 54.4% last year), and "Japanese people are kind and have good manners and high cultural standards" (52.6%, 39.2%) were the most common answers with more than half of the respondents choosing the answers. These results imply that the high trust of Japan's manufacturing technology and the highly valued Japanese national character contributed to the "favorable" impression of Japan. "Remarkable economic growth after WWII" has decreased by 30 percentage points from 49.4% last year to 19.7% this year.

On the current deteriorating sentiments toward one another's countries, 32.5% of the Japanese respondents chose "this is an undesirable situation, I have concerns," 46.9% chose "The situation is a problem and it needs to be resolved." In total, close to 80% of the respondents regard the worsening national sentiments as an issue.

This was the same for the Chinese respondents as 35.2% chose "this is an undesirable situation, I have concerns" and another 35.2% chose "The situation is a problem and it needs to be resolved." This shows 70% see the current state of national sentiment as a problem.

On the question of "what comes to mind" when you think of China, the most common answer among Japanese respondents was "Air pollution" at 41.2% (34.1% last year), which surpassed "Chinese cuisine" (34.0%, 39.7% last year), which had been the most popular answer in the past polls. "The issue on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands" ranked third with 28.6% (34.1% last year), yet there is a noticeable decrease since last year, which indicates that the Japanese national sentiment on "Senkaku" is showing signs of calming.

"What comes to mind" when you think of Japan, for the Chinese respondents, "The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands" (46.6%, 57.5% last year) and "Nanjing Massacre" (35.3%, 50.3% last year) are still the most common answers. However, significant decreases can be observed in comparison to last year's results, which also shows signs of calming in China. The non-political options such as "Japanese cuisine" (16.4%, 9.5% last year), "Mt. Fuji" (12.5%, 9.7% last year) show increases in this year's poll. This could also be considered as evidence of the situation having calmed down.

On the question "Historical events and incidents in one another's country that you know," the most common answer from the Japanese respondents was "Senkaku boat collision incident" at 79.2%, and as a whole it is noticeable that recent events left a strong impression on the Japanese public's mind. That said, throughout the pre- and post-WWII era, around 20% of the Japanese respondents know most of the historical events in China. This shows a relatively wide range of knowledge and understanding of Chinese history by the Japanese public.

On the Chinese side, the answer "Manchurian Incident, Lugouqiao (Lugou Bridge) Incident and Nanjing Massacre" (76.5%, 91.4% last year) maintained its prominence among the Chinese respondents. This is followed by "Japan's purchase of the Diaoyu Islands," which option is newly created for this year's survey, at 49.6%. As a whole, historical wars and related events are prominent in the Chinese public's knowledge of Japan while understanding of post-WWII events in Japan was scarce: Around 10% of the Chinese respondents chose these options. That said, recent events related to Japan-China relations such as "Japan's purchase of the Diaoyu Islands" and "Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine" (24.9%) are relatively well known among the Chinese public.

In response to the question "Chinese politicians that you know," "Mao Zedong" (92.0%, 90.1% last year) topped the poll by the Japanese respondents, and Chinese leaders in the 20th century are relatively well known. However, "Xi Jinping" remains at 58.8% (48.3% last year), therefore it indicates that 40% of the Japanese public still do not know the Chinese leader. Chinese Prime Minister "Li Keqiang" was also at a mere 10.1% (8.0% last year).
For the "Japanese politicians" whom Chinese respondents know, the answer Japanese Prime Minister "Shinzo Abe" has increased from 47.4% last year to 75.2% this year. This is followed by "Junichiro Koizumi" at 42.8% (50.2% last year).

69.0% of the Japanese respondents regard China as "Socialism/communism." This trend has not changed in the past 10 years: It continuously maintained about 70% in the past surveys and has been the most common understanding of China. This is followed by "Totalitarianism (one-party dictatorship)" at 40.1% (37.4% last year), and "Militarism" at 35.9% (33.9% last year). There is a steady increase in opinion that sees China as "Totalitarianism" and "Hegemonism" during the past 10 years. The option "Totalitarianism (one-party dictatorship)" was added to the list in 2007, and it was at 27.4% that year. "Hegemonism" was 22.6% this year, but in the first opinion poll in 2005, it was 11.8%.

On the other hand, the most common answer among the Chinese respondents was "Capitalism" at 39.7% (42.1% last year). In last year's survey, which was conducted right after the nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands by Japan, "Hegemonism" had increased sharply to 48.9% last year, but it has calmed down to 36.7% this year. "Militarism" has also decreased from 41.9% (last year) to 36.5%, yet still close to 40% of the Chinese public regard Japan as a military power. During the past 10 years, "Militarism" and "Ethnicism" have steadily decreased since 2005 when "Militarism" was 60.3% and "Ethnicism" was 49.5%, which has halved to 25.8% in this year's poll.

Instead, what have increased in the past 10 years are "Nationalism" and "Hegemonism." In comparison to past results, "Nationalism" has increased by 10 percentage points from 27.5% in 2006 to 37.5% this year, and "Hegemonism" has also increased by more than 10 percentage points from 22.4% in 2010.The "Pacifism" (10.5%, 11.8% in 2005), "Democracy" (14.4%, 23.7% in 2005) and "International cooperation" (6.7%, 13.9% in 2005) that Japan has advocated to the world since the end of WWII, remains at around 10%, which has even declined since the first annual poll 10 years ago.

76.1% of the Japanese respondents see Chinese people as "Untrustworthy," and more than 60% think they are "Egoistic," "Dishonest," "Uncooperative," "Stubborn" and "Belligerent." In comparison to last year, the Japanese public's perception of the Chinese national character is worsening, but the Chinese public's perception of the Japanese national character shows a slight improvement.

83.4% of the Japanese respondents believed that Japan-China relations are "bad" and "relatively bad." The figure surpassed the 79.7% of last year and is the worst result during the past nine years.

For the Chinese counterparts, the negative evaluation of the China-Japan relationship ("bad" and "relatively bad") declined from 90.3% last year to 67.2%. Chinese public perception of bilateral relations between China and Japan has slightly improved since Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands. This year's 67.2% is higher than the 54.9% in 2005. The worsening relations between Japan and China have not substantially improved.

Pessimistic views about prospective Japan-China relations prevailed in two countries. The percentage of Japanese expecting even worse bilateral relations in the years ahead increased to 36.8% from 28.3% last year. Only 8% of Japanese polled believed the Japan-China relations "will improve" or "will probably improve."

The negative evaluation of prospective China-Japan relations on the Chinese side also grew to 49.8% from 45.3% last year. This figure was higher than the worst record of 46.6% in 2005. 17.7% of Chinese believed that bilateral relations "will improve" or "will probably improve," which slightly increased from 15.1% last year.

The biggest concern perceived by Japanese is the "territorial issue," but it dropped to 58.6% from 72.1% last year. "China's anti-Japanese education" was considered as the second highest concern (42.9%). Lack of trust between the Japanese and Chinese governments (35.0%), and lack of trustful relations between Japanese and Chinese people (25.5%) are regarded as the major barriers to bilateral relations.

64.8% of Chinese respondents believed that the "territorial issue" was the biggest concern. This result is consistent with previous surveys. However, it dropped by 12 percentage points from 77.5% last year. 31.9% of Chinese showed concerns on "Japan's historical understanding and historical education." It dropped slightly from 36.6% last year. It is similar to Japan. "Lack of trust between the Chinese and Japanese governments" (25.4%) and "lack of trustful relations between Chinese and Japanese people" (15.5%) were regarded as major barriers to bilateral relations.

70.6% of Japanese respondents viewed the Japan-China relationship as important. However, the percentage dropped from 74.1% last year and was the lowest during the past 10 years.

65.0 percent of Chinese respondents viewed the China-Japan relationship as important. However, the percentage dropped from 72.3% last year and was the lowest during the past 10 years. In particular, 92.5% of Chinese regarded bilateral relations as important in 2010, which indicates a significant drop of 30 percentage points.

As reasons for the importance of Japan-China relations, 55.8% of Japanese and 29.4% of Chinese regarded "the cooperation between Japan and China is indispensable to peace and prosperity in Asia." "The two countries are the world's No. 2 and No. 3 economic powers" (48.6%) and "the two countries are neighbors" (45.5%) were the two most popular reasons for the importance of Japan-China relations among the Chinese public. The reasons for the importance of bilateral relations in China largely derive from the consideration of realistic interests.

Comparing the importance between Japan-China relations and Japan-U.S. relations, 50.1% of Japanese (52.2% last year) regarded both of them were equally important. 36.4 percent of Japanese (37.4% last year) preferred a more important relationship with the United States. Only 3.7% of Japanese thought that Japan-China relations were more important.

40.3% of Chinese regarded China-Japan relations and China-U.S. relations were equally important. It dropped largely from 54.2% last year. Conversely, the percentage of Chinese who viewed China-Japan relations more important increased to 22.0% from 10.2% last year. 22.5% of Chinese viewed China-U.S. relations were more important, which was as high as the percentage last year (24.0%).

In addition, 55.7% of Japanese felt more affinity toward the United States than China. Only 5.6% of Japanese felt more affinity toward China than the United States. 44.4% of Chinese respondents (50.3% last year) felt no affinity toward either Japan or the United States. 30.7% of Chinese (28.1% last year) felt more affinity toward the United States while only 4.4% of Chinese (3.0% last year) felt more affinity toward Japan.

47.0% of Japanese viewed Japan-China relations and Japan-South Korea relations were equally important. 15.6% of Japanese viewed Japan-China relations more important. 12.4%of Japanese viewed the Japan-South Korea relations more important.

43.5% of Chinese viewed China-Japan relations and China-South Korea relations were equally important. 33.3% of Chinese regarded China-South Korea relations were more important than China-Japan relations. Only 6.5% of Chinese viewed China-Japan relations more important.

37.2% of Japanese (45.5% last year) felt more affinity toward South Korea than China. Only 5.0% of Japanese (5.9% last year) felt more affinity toward China. 31.8% of Japanese (24.6% last year) felt no affinity toward either China or South Korea.

However, 52.7% of Chinese felt more affinity toward South Korea and Japan while only 3.5% of Chinese felt more affinity toward Japan. 21.8% of Chinese felt no affinity toward either Japan or South Korea.

※This particular question was included in the Chinese questionnaire only. Japanese results are from the 2nd Japan-South Korea opinion poll, which was conducted from May to June 2014.

In response to the question "whether Japan and China should cooperate on important issues in Asia," more than 60% of Japanese respondents are "in favor" (including "relatively in favor," same shall apply hereafter) of the proposal at 66.1% (68.6% last year), and a mere 7.7% (6.9% last year) are against the idea of Japan-China cooperation. 52.2% (53.0% last year) of the Chinese respondents are also "in favor" of the proposal. However, 33.5% are against the idea of cooperation with Japan.

On the question of issues that require Japan-China cooperation, "Environmental issues such as air pollution" (85.6%, 81.9% last year) and "Food safety" (80.2%, 67.1% last year) were the most prominent answers by the Japanese respondents, this implies that there are raising concerns on immediate and tangible issues that require cooperation between Japan and China. These are followed by "North Korea's nuclear program" (67.3%, 71.4% last year) and "peace and security in East Asia" (59.6%, 57.6% last year).

On the other hand, there was no clear idea of areas for cooperation from the Chinese respondents' answers. The most common answer was "peace and security in East Asia" (37.8%, 40.0% last year), but it did not reach 40%. It is followed by "safety of nuclear power" (33.8%, 27.3% last year), and after that, until the eighth popular answer "cooperation on security issues" (22.8%, 15.6% last year), these answers are crammed into the narrow 10 percentage point range.

As for visits to one another's country, 70.4% of the Japanese respondents chose "do not want to visit," which is at the highest level in the past seven annual polls. 72.6% of Chinese respondents answered that they "do not want to visit" Japan. This figure has slightly decreased since last year, yet it still maintains a high level with more than 70% of the answer.

64.4% (60.7% last year) of Japanese respondents expressed the importance (including "Important" and "Relatively important," same shall apply hereafter) of private and direct interaction between the Japanese and Chinese public, in order to improve and to develop Japan-China relations.

Also for Chinese respondents, "Important" was at a high level with 63.4% (67.7% last year), both the Chinese and Japanese public recognize the importance of private and direct interaction.

Among the reasons why private and civil exchange was "important," "expand mutual understanding between Japanese and Chinese people through interaction" (70.7%, 66.2% last year), and "to deepen practical understanding of China" (66.8%, 60.6% last year) were the most common answers by the Japanese respondents, which indicates that they regard private interaction and civil exchange as vital for "mutual understanding."

On the other hand, since 56.7% (46.0% last year) of the Chinese respondents chose the answer "To gain the basis for expanding mutual benefit," they expect the function of "expanding mutual benefit" to be civil interaction and exchange rather than understanding each other. It is also noticeable that since the answer "To have grounds to complement diplomatic relations" remains at a lower level (13.0%, 22.0% last year), the Chinese public expect idiomatic roles for civil interaction and exchange that differ from clearly diplomatic relations by the governments.

When the Japanese respondents were asked if current diplomatic relations between Japan and China were being conducted effectively, "not being conducted effectively" was 32.7% and "relatively not being conducted effectively" was 16.2%. The total percentage of Japanese who consider some ineffectiveness is nearly 50% (48.9%). Some 46.2% withheld their opinion with "neither effective nor ineffective." The percentage who considered there is some effectiveness (i.e., those who considered relations are either effective or relatively effective) is no more than 4.5%.

On the other hand, 13.7% of the Chinese responded that the diplomatic relations were "being conducted effectively," and 37.3% chose "relatively being conducted effectively." A total of 51.0% considers that diplomatic relations are effective. That said, it must also be noted that "not being conducted effectively" (7.6%) and "relatively not being conducted effectively" (22.0%) are also sizable at nearly 30%, which indicates that the 29.6% of the Chinese evaluate that diplomatic relations are not effective. Close to 20% (19.1% "neither effective nor not effective") of Chinese respondents withheld their judgment on this matter.

As to why diplomatic relations were not effective, two responses stood out. Most Japanese (72.8%) attributed the ineffectiveness to antagonism toward recognition of history and territory followed by the attitudes of China's political leaders (57.5%). The most popular responses among Chinese polled were antagonism toward recognition of history and territory (55.4%) followed by the political attitude of Japan's leaders (47.7%). Nearly 40% (39.5%) of Japanese respondents and 15.4% of Chinese cited the political attitude of their leaders.

The percentage of Japanese who replied that the summits, which have not been held since May 2012, were necessary was 64.6% (2013: 64.9%). The percentage who felt they were unnecessary was less than 10%.

By contrast the percentage of Chinese who replied that the summits were necessary exceeded 50% at 52.7% but had markedly declined from 57.1% last year. The percentage who felt the summits were unnecessary approached 40% (37.1%, 2013: 37.3%). The perceptions between the two countries are quite different.

When asked what issues should be discussed if a summit was held, the most popular response among Japanese was for a broad ranging discussion on how to improve relations between both countries (45.8%). This answer was followed by "the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands" (32.2%). Only 13.9% feel that "historical understanding" should be on the agenda.

Among Chinese respondents the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands was cited most often (45.8%) followed by the Japanese recognition of historical issues (38.1%). There were also a relatively sizable 35.7% of respondents who chose the option "a broad ranging discussion on how to improve relations between both countries."

More Japanese respondents (42.7%, 2013: 45.1%) took the pessimistic view that "it will be difficult to resolve historical issues even after bilateral relations develop." When looking at the results from past 10 annual polls, this view has been dominant since 2011. This can be understood as a reflection of the current difficult situation surrounding Japan-China relations. The optimistic view that "historical issues will be resolved as bilateral relations develop," remained at a little over 20% (22.2%, 2013: 20.25%).

Conversely the optimistic view was the most popular response among Chinese respondents at 34% (2013: 35.4%). The percentage of respondents that felt bilateral relations will not develop unless historical issues are resolved was 31.4% (2013: 37.9%), which shows a decrease from last year. The percentage who felt that "it will be difficult to resolve historical issues even after bilateral relations develop," the most popular answer for Japanese, was just about a quarter at 26.9% (2013: 24.1%).

Asked specifically what must be resolved among the historical issues between the two countries, the percentage of Japanese respondents that cited "China's anti-Japanese education and criticisms of Japan's past acts in textbooks in Chinese schools" was 56% (2013: 58.6%), followed by "the Chinese media's news coverage of Japan," which polled 43.1% (2013: 43.4%). What is also evident was that there were about 20% of respondents who cited faults in Japan itself such as "Japan's perception of its invasions of China in the 20th century" (25.7%, 2013: 26.4%) and "the depiction of history in textbooks in Japanese schools" (16.8%, 2013: 20.0%).

When Chinese respondents were asked what historical issues they felt had to be resolved, although some have decreased from last year, the majority of popular responses were related to Japanese recognition of history. The need for Japan to recognize and apologize for its past invasions was the most common response (54.8%, 2013: 61.0%).

In comparison to the percentage of respondents who found fault with Japan, the percentage that found fault with China was comparatively small: 28.1% cited the need for history education to be fair and objective in China (2013: 28.5%), 10% cited "the need for Chinese politicians to refrain from inappropriate remarks or behavior" (2013: 9.0%), and 3.6% cited "the need for the Chinese media to practice fair and objective news coverage of Japan" (2013: 4.2%).

The most common view among Japanese polled was that they saw "no problem with the Japanese prime minister visiting the war-related Yasukuni Shrine" (40.7%, 2013: 46.0%). If this is combined with the percentage who saw "no problem with the prime minister visiting in a private capacity" (27.5%, 2013: 27.5) then approximately 70% are tolerant of some visit to the shrine. This contrasts significantly with the percentage who felt that the prime minister should not visit in any capacity, which slightly increased from 9.9% to 15.0%.

The percentage of Chinese respondents who felt Japanese prime ministers "should not visit the shrine in any capacity" was unchanged at approximately 60% (59.5%, 2013: 62.7%). If the percentage of Chinese who saw no problem if the prime minister visited the shrine officially (8.2%, 2013: 9.0%) is added to the percentage who saw no problem if the visit is in a private capacity (20.9%, 2013: 20.4%), then the percentage tolerant of some kind of visit does not reach 30%.

The percentage of Japanese and Chinese who recognize the existence of the territorial dispute between the two countries is respectively 64.3% and 76.2% (2013: 62.7% and 82.2%). The recognition of the dispute among Japanese has increased as the two governments have adopted different public points of view.　

However, the ideas for resolution of the territorial dispute differ significantly between Japanese and Chinese. The most popular solution to resolve this territorial dispute among Japanese polled was that "the two countries should promptly proceed toward negotiations with a view to resolve their issues by peaceful means" (48.4%, 2013: 49.1%) and this is followed by "Through diplomatic negotiation, Japan should be made to acknowledge the existence of the territorial dispute" (41.2%, 2013: 42.4%). The next most popular solution was that the matter should be taken to the International Court of Justice to be resolved in accordance with international law (41.2%, 2013: 42.4%).

The most popular response among Chinese was that "to protect its territory, China should increase its effective control over it" (63.7%, 2013: 58.1%) and this is followed by "Through diplomatic negotiation, Japan should be made to acknowledge the existence of the territorial dispute" (41.2%, 2013: 42.4%). The will to resolve the dispute by legal means or peaceful negotiation has weakened and the percentage who responded that "the matter should be taken to the International Court of Justice to be resolved in accordance with international law" fell from 20.1% last year to 13.7% this year, and those who responded "Both countries should promptly proceed toward negotiations in order to resolve their issues through peaceful means" also fell from 43.6% to 32.6%. Yet, it is also worth noting that 27.1% of Japanese respondents and 26.1% of Chinese respondents cited "prevention of an armed conflict must come before any hasty attempts to resolve the issue."

Respondents in both countries (63.1% of Japanese (2013: 67.7%) and 66.9% of Chinese (2013: 82.3%)) believe that the conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands influences the economies of both countries.

In the past nine opinion polls, Japanese respondents had expressed the strongest concern over "North Korea" (68.6%, 73.4% last year) as a "military threat" while the Japanese respondents who answered "China" have increased from 61.8% last year to 64.3% in this year's poll. This puts China on the same level as North Korea in the Japanese public's perception of nation-states that pose military threats.

The Chinese public feel the strongest military threat from "the United States," yet as a result of a decrease in those answering "the United States" from 71.6% last year to 57.8%, the answer "Japan" (55.2%, 53.9% last year) became one of the highest military threats as perceived by the Chinese public.

As for the reasons why the Japanese respondents felt there was a military threat from "China," "repeatedly infringe upon territorial waters of Japan" was the most common with 71.9% (71.4% last year). This is followed by "the conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands and marine resources" (65.2%, 62.6% last year) and "Continuous military buildup in China" (53.8%). In short, the existing tension in the East China Sea and expansion of Chinese military action in the area are the reasons why the Japanese public feel a military threat from China.

In the reasons given by the Chinese respondents who answered that they feel Japan is a military threat, the most common answer was "Japan's attempt to besiege China on a military front in cooperation with the United States," which showed a significant increase from 44.6% last year to 58.2%. "Japan's lack of a proper apology and remorse over the history of invasions of China" (52.4%) and "Although it effectively occupies the Diaoyu Islands, Japan does not recognize the territorial dispute" (51.9%) followed the answer. The ratio of Chinese respondents who answered that "Since the ratification of the right to collective self-defense, the move to amend the article on peace in the Japanese Constitution has strengthened, and it can be actualized" has increased from 4.7% last year to 14.5%. This can be seen as a reflection of the current Japanese political moves on its security agenda.

On the possibility of a military conflict between Japan and China, the most Japanese respondents (38.0%) chose "There will not be conflict in the future," yet it had decreased significantly from 46.7% last year. While the answer "Don't know" exceeded 30% (32.9%, 29.3% last year), the total of "There will be conflict within a few years" and　"There will be conflict in the future" came close to the 30% mark (29.0%), and showed a significant increase from 23.7% last year.

Among the Chinese respondents, 42.2% think that "There will be conflict in the future" and 11.2% think "There will be conflict within a few years." In total, more than half of Chinese respondents (53.4%) perceive the possibility of a military conflict between Japan and China.

On the question for the necessity of a multilateral framework for East Asian security cooperation, while 47.2% of the Japanese respondents answered that it is "necessary," the Chinese respondents who chose "Necessary" have decreased from last year's 54.0% to 43.0% and "Not necessary" have increased from 34.1% (last year) to 38.7%. In Japan, just less than half of the respondents agreed to the proposal, yet in China, the divide in opinion became evident. However, even though the multilateral framework is considered as necessary by some, there is no consensus on "which nation-states should participate in the framework."

In Japan, "Japan," "China" and "South Korea" are prominent with over 80%, which indicates general public opinion that the multilateral framework for East Asian security cooperation should be formed among Japan, China and South Korea. At the same time, additions of "the United States," "North Korea" and "Russia" are supported by more than half of the Japanese respondents.　　　

On the other hand, 80.4% (73.7% last year) of the Chinese respondents supported China's participation in the multilateral framework. Apart from China, "Russia" has increased from 38.3% last year to 57.4%. With "the United States" (51.2% and 54.2% last year), these are the only countries whose participation is supported by more than half of the Chinese respondents. "Japan" and "South Korea's" participation were expected by 43.1% and 39.1%, respectively.

On the question of the country and region that will lead future world politics, even though it has decreased from 55.5% last year to 44.9% this year, "the United States" maintained the prominence in Japanese public opinion. This is followed by "G-8 or G-7" (38.1%). This shows a similar result to last year. On the other hand, Japanese respondents who chose "China" have decreased for five consecutive years, which resulted in 11.3% of responses this year (16.2% last year).

In the Chinese public's idea of "the country and region that will lead future world politics" while "the United States" had been the most popular and had been followed by "China" in the past, in this year's survey, "China" has become the most popular answer at 41.8% (41.6% last year) and "the United States" has decreased from 42.7% last year to 31.3% this year. The Chinese consciousness that China and the United States will lead the world is the same as last year, yet this year, they are begging to picture the future with stronger Chinese leadership.

In the future, can Japan and China coexist and realize mutual prosperity in Asia, or will the confrontation continue? On this question, 54.6% of the Japanese and 50.3% of Chinese answered that they "Wish to have peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity, but are not sure if it will be realized." The "Confrontation will continue" was 17.3% in Japan and 20.7% in China, which are about the same level in both countries. While "Peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity are possible" was 16.5% in China, only 7.8% of the Japanese respondents chose the answer.

In the Japanese public's projection on the Chinese economy in 2030, "It will be difficult for the Chinese economy to continue its smooth growth and its future is exceedingly uncertain" was the most common answer at 34.4% (29.3%), and it was followed by "The Chinese economy will continue to grow, but it will be difficult to match the U.S." at 23.0%. Only 5.1% of the Japanese respondents think that "China will surpass the U.S. and become the greatest economic power in the world".

In the projection on the Japanese economy, most of the Chinese (28.1%) answered that "Japan, as the third-greatest economic power in the world, will not become a military power," which increased from 24.4% last year. This was followed by "Both Japan's rank and influence as an economic power will decline" at 24.6% (33.1% last year), and in addition with 23.6% saying "The rank of Japan as an economic power will fall, but its influence will be maintained," close to half of the Chinese respondents saw "Japan's status as an economic power will decline."

On the economic relations between Japan and China, the Japanese respondents who answered that "Economic relations between the two countries compete against one another, thus a win-win relationship cannot be constructed" have increased from 42.8% last year to 47.1% this year (including "Agree" and "Tend to agree"), it can be understood that there is an increase in the perception of the economic relationship as zero sum.　

On the other hand, the Chinese respondents who answered that "Economic relations between the two countries complement one another, thus a win-win relationship can be constructed" have increased from 58.6% last year to 62.9% this year (including "Agree" and "Tend to agree"), which shows a positive vision on the Japan-China economic relationship and it differs from the Japanese public's pessimistic perception.

On the question of whether economic relations can distance themselves from the political confrontation between Japan and China, in Japanese public opinion, "Cold political and cold economic relations" (36.2%, 40.1% last year), and "Cold political relations but hot economic relations" (35.3%, 32.1% last year) are on the same level. On the other hand, in Chinese public opinion, the view that "Cold political and cold economic relations" will prevail exceeded half of the responses at 52.7% (56.5% last year), which was significantly higher than the view that "Cold political relations but hot economic relations" can be maintained (38.9%, 38.3% last year).

There is no significant change in the Japanese public's perception of freedom of speech and the press in China throughout the 10 years since the first annual joint opinion polls. It is the same for this 10th year that slightly less than 50% of the Japanese respondents (48.6%, 45.7% last year) consider that "Freedom of the press is guaranteed to some extent, but it is effectively controlled in China," and even the answer "Information is strictly controlled and there is no freedom of the press and speech" reached 30.2% (33.3% last year).

On the other hand, 57.1% (49.7%) of the Chinese respondents think that "Freedom of the press is effectively controlled in Japan" and it has increased from last year. Although the perception that "there is no freedom of the press and speech in Japan" has decreased from 15.7% last year to 20.3%, still about 70% of the Chinese public consider that there is no freedom of speech and the press, or they are effectively controlled in Japan.

Among the Japanese respondents, the ratio of people who consider the coverage of Japan-China relations in domestic media as "Objective and impartial" were a mere 26.8% (25.4% last year), and the answer "Neither objective nor impartial" exceeds the number at 30.5% (25.1% last year). However, it is also noticeable that "Don't know" exceeded 40% at 42.4% (36.3% last year).

In China, 73.9% (84.5% last year) of the respondents think that the Chinese media's coverage of Japan-China relations is "Objective and impartial," which is in contrast with the Japanese result. Yet, it is worth noting that "Neither objective nor impartial" has increased from 7.5% last year to 13.3% this year.

In response to the question "Do opinions on the Internet reflect public opinion in your country?" Japanese respondents who chose "Think the Internet does not appropriately reflect public opinion" (including "Think the Internet less appropriately reflects public opinion," same shall apply hereafter) exceeded the half point mark at 51.7% (54.4% last year).

Also among the Chinese respondents, "The Internet does not appropriately reflect public opinion" was 50.9% (46.1% last year) while "The Internet appropriately reflects public opinion" decreased nearly 10 percentage points from 47.5% last year to 38.6% this year.

In the past nine annual opinion polls, it was indicated that there was very little direct interaction between the Japanese and Chinese public, and the perceptions on each other's country depended on the information in the domestic media. In the tenth opinion poll in 2014, this tendency has not changed.

The ratio of Japanese respondents who answered that they "Have visited China" was a mere 14.3% (14.7% last year). This trend has not changed since the first opinion polls in 2005.

The total of Japanese respondents who have close Chinese friends or Chinese acquaintances that they can converse with was 21.1% (20.3% last year). This indicates that the Japanese public who have visited China or who have direct interaction with Chinese acquaintances is about 20%, and this also has not changed throughout the 10 opinion polls.

On the extent of exposure to information on China, overwhelmingly 73.9% (76.1% last year) of the Japanese respondents answered that they "only receive information on China through Japanese media," whereas people who "have directly experienced Chinese culture" (10.7%, 8.6% last year), "have seen Chinese media (TV programs, newspapers or the Internet)" (13.7%, 10.9% last year) remain around 10%.

At the same time, the major Japanese public's information source on China is "Japanese news media" at 96.5% (95.0% last year). Within the 96.5%, 76.1% (79.7%) are receiving information from "TV." Therefore, there is a high probability that the Japanese public's impression and perception of China depend not on direct information such as a visit to China or conversation with Chinese people, but on Japanese media and TV in particular. This was also the same with the past opinion polls.

In comparison to the Japanese public, the Chinese public's degree of direct interaction with Japanese is scarcer. Although, the Chinese respondents who answered that they "have visited Japan" have increased from 2.7% last year to 6.4% this year, people who "have not visited Japan" still occupy the majority at 93.3% (97.2% last year). The total of Chinese respondents who have "close Japanese friends" or "Japanese acquaintances that they can converse with" was a mere 3.1% (3.3% last year), and there is no noticeable change over the 10 years.

The overwhelming majority of the Chinese public (80.1%, 80.3% last year) receive information about Japan through Chinese media. However, the people who "have seen Japanese media (TV programs, newspapers or the Internet)" (23.7%, 14.7% last year), "have directly experienced Japanese culture" (17.0%, 8.6% last year), have noticeably increased since last year and these are at a higher level in comparison to the Japanese public.

There is also a difference in the trend on the source of information about Japan: While 91.4% of the Chinese respondents cited "Chinese news media" as a source of information (within which 78.8% chose "TV"), 61.4% (65.3% last year) chose "Chinese TV dramas and movies," and 37.4% (36.3% last year) chose "Chinese publications (including school textbooks)." This shows that there are relatively diverse information sources about Japan in China and this implies that most Chinese people form impressions and perceptions of Japan mainly through Chinese TV news complemented by Chinese TV dramas, movies and publications.